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Abstract. Recently, the blockchain technique was put in the spotlight
as it introduced a systematic approach for multiple parties to reach con-
sensus without needing trust. However, the application of this technique
in practice is severely restricted due to its limitations in throughput. In
this paper, we propose a novel consensus model, namely the implicit con-
sensus, with a distinctive blockchain-based distributed ledger in which
each node holds its individual blockchain. In our system, the consensus
is not on the transactions, but on a special type of blocks called Check
Points that are used to validate individual transactions. Our system ex-
ploits the ideas of self-interest and spontaneous sharding and achieves
unbounded throughput with the transaction reliability that equivalent
to traditional Byzantine fault tolerance schemes.
Keywords: blockchain, distributed ledger, consensus algorithm, byzan-
tine fault tolerance
1 Introduction
Blockchain, introduced and firstly applied in Bitcoin [1], is one of the hottest
techniques in the information technology at this moment. Researchers see a huge
potential in this technique and believe that it can be used as a systematic ap-
proach to replace trust. More precisely, in a network in which nodes do not
trust each other, blockchain provides a way for the nodes to reach consensus and
cooperate without a third party or a central authority. Typically, a blockchain
technique is a distributed append-only database which consists of two compo-
nents. First, as its name suggests, the database is an ordered sequences of blocks
which are chained together. The newly generated data forms a new block and
chains to the existing chain with a digest of the cryptographic hash function of
the previous block. Second, a consensus algorithm is used for the network to
agree on the new block that will be appended to the chain.
1.1 Problem Statement
One of the major problems of the blockchain technique is the scalability, which
is caused by the limitation of the current consensus algorithms. Reaching con-
sensus for a number of nodes that might be malicious, commonly known as
the Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT) problem [2], has been extensively studied
for over 30 years. The problem could be described as the following. In an asyn-
chronous network with malicious nodes, a BFT scheme should have the following
properties.
– Agreement: If an honest node propose a vector v, then all honest nodes
agree with v.
– Correctness: If an honest node decides v, then v must be proposed by at
least one honest node.
– Termination: If an honest node propose v, then all honest node will even-
tually decide a vector.
In general, these properties are not feasible for a full-asynchronous network [3].
However, with some assumptions like weak synchronous or probabilistic agree-
ment, these properties can be achieved with message complexity of O(N2) [4,5]
when the number of the adversary is less than ⌊N−1
3
⌋.
1.2 State-of-the-Art
Towards the scalability of BFT. Many schemes have been proposed to in-
crease the scalability of the traditional BFT schemes. Luu et al. divides the
network into subgroups uniformly and runs BFT within the subgroup [6]. Other
schemes like [7,8] opportunistically apply simpler schemes for good network sce-
narios, usually with message complexity of O(N), and use “safe” schemes like
PBFT [5] as backup. In networks with good connectivity and limited amount of
malicious node, these approaches result in message complexity of O(N) but risks
even higher latency comparing to traditional BFT schemes in bad situations.
Increasing the throughput of POW. By introducing mining costs for
messaging and incentives to compensate the costs, Bitcoin proposed a scalable
solution for BFT that reduces the message complexity to O(N) and functions in
large networks with thousands of nodes. However, this scheme requires synchrony
amongst the majority, which restricts the throughput of Bitcoin since the block
size and frequency are then limited [9]. Scalable Bitcoin schemes like Bitcoin-NG
and lightning network [10,11] separate the consensus from the contents of the
block. As a result, the synchrony is not restricted by the block size and frequency.
However, extra economical punishment methods are required since the costs and
incentives of the traditional POW no longer gives protection to the validity of
the contents.
Leader selection. The schemes of [1,10,11] can be seen as two parts: an
economical rewarded leader election process and an economical guaranteed val-
idation process. Schemes like Byzcoin, ALGORAND, hybrid consensus, and the
sleepy model of consensus [8,12,13,14] keep the leader selection part. Then, in-
stead of a sole leader, they select a group of leaders and the validation is guar-
anteed by BFT algorithms. This approach has some advantages over both POW
and BFT. However, extra effort is needed to guarantee that the leader selec-
tion is unbiased, i.e., the malicious nodes cannot predict or control the selection
results.
Sharding. The sharding idea proposed in Etheruem and Omniledger [15,16]
has received a lot of attention recently. The basic idea of sharding is that the
network is divided into shards and the intra-shard transactions are only agreed,
validated, and recorded in the nodes of that shard. Then, some nodes are se-
lected to validate and record the inter-shard transactions. In networks where
the transactions pattern is rather isolated, sharding has a potential of achieving
unbounded performance, i.e., less than O(N) message complexity. The reason is
that the transactions are not mandatory to be broadcast to the whole network.
However, the choice of the shards for a network to achieve optimal performance
remains a challenge.
1.3 Implicit Consensus
In this paper, a novel consensus model, namely the implicit consensus, is pro-
posed, which achieves unbounded throughput for a distributed ledger type of
blockchain system with equivalent reliability on validated transactions to tradi-
tional BFT based schemes. It has some similarities to some of the existing ideas
like the side-chain ideas used in [11] and sharding [15,16]. However, compare
to the existing schemes, the main innovations of our consensus model are the
following.
– Replacing the termination property of BFT schemes by the self-interest phe-
nomenon. In other words, for each transaction, our scheme does not guar-
antee consensus. However, because it is in the interest of the related parties,
e.g., the issuer of this transactions, to convince the other nodes that this
transaction is valid. Thus, nodes are encouraged to prove the validity and
agreement of their transactions to as many nodes as they can and we guar-
antee that the malicious nodes cannot prevent them from doing that. It is
arguably more close to real-life scenario. To distinguish this from traditional
consensus in which each transaction has explicitly reached consensus (termi-
nation property), we call this implicit consensus. With implicit consensus,
our scheme is scalable since the message complexity is reduced to O(N).
– Spontaneous sharding. For each transaction, we prove that the other two
properties of BFT, agreement and correctness, will hold as long as the trans-
actions is locally validated by our validation scheme. This is done with col-
lecting some faction of the total transactions of the network related to this
transaction, called proofs. As a result, the network is spontaneously sharded
since rational nodes will optimize their storage and transmission costs by
only validating and recording the proofs of their transactions. There is no
need for mechanisms that allocate the transaction set needed to be vali-
dated and recored for each node. Similar as sharding, our scheme achieves
unbounded performance, i.e., the message complexity is less than O(N) since
transactions are not mandatory to be broadcast to the whole network.
– Uncompromised reliability. Although our scheme has its similarity to side-
chain schemes like lightning network [11], we guarantee that the validated
transactions on the the individual chains (can be seen as side-chains) are as
reliable as they are on the main chain. This is fundamentally different from
side-chain approaches like lightning network, in which the reliability is not
guaranteed by the main chain, but by the locked deposit.
1.4 Structure of Our System
We consider an asynchronous network with N nodes and f ≤ ⌊N−1
3
⌋ adversaries.
To achieve the implicit consensus, we propose a permissioned blockchain-based
distributed ledger consisting of four layers: transactions, individual blockchains,
the consensus scheme, and the validation scheme. The first layer of our system
is transactions, which are defined in a similar fashion as Bitcoin. The second
layer is individual blockchains. In our system each node has its own gene-
sis block and blockchain, in which only transactions that related to the node
itself are recorded. Besides the blocks that consists of transactions which are
called Transaction Blocks (TBs), a special type of blocks called Check Point
(CP) is introduced. The CPs contain no transaction, but some already estab-
lished consensus and a hash of the previous block. The third layer of our scheme
is the consensus scheme, in which we plug in one of the existing Byzantine
fault tolerance (BFT) schemes like [5,7,17,18] to reach consensus on the hashes
of the CPs. One of the fundamental differences between our system and other
blockchain systems is that the consensus is reached only on the hashes of the CPs
instead of all transactions. As a result, if some CP reached consensus, the trans-
actions that came before the CP are tamper-proof. However, this tells nothing
about the validity of the transactions in these parts. Hence, in the fourth part, a
validation scheme is used to validate individual transactions. The validation
scheme is executed locally and only based on point-to-point communications.
Since the CPs in the consensus have “sealed” the chains, the authenticity and
integrity of the chains can be easily verified. We prove that although the vali-
dation scheme is run locally, the result is correct and consistent for all honest
nodes, which suggests the agreement and correctness properties, i.e., implicit
consensus.
1.5 Content of the Paper
Firstly, we introduce the four-layer system in Section 2. Then we show the nec-
essary theorems and proofs in Section 3. The performance of our system is dis-
cussed with the focus on throughput and reliability in Section 4. In Section 5,
we conclude our work.
2 Our System
2.1 Transactions
We consider a transaction based value-exchange blockchain system similar to
Bitcoin, i.e., a distributed ledger. The s-th transaction from node i to node j is
denoted by tr(i→ j, s). In this paper, a cryptographic hash function is denoted
by Y = H(X), in which Y is called the digest of X . Furthermore, we assume
that there is a public-key infrastructure (PKI) such that each node holds a secret
private key while the corresponding public key is known to all other nodes. A
transaction tr(i→ j, s) contains the following information.
– The sender and the receiver, i.e., i and j.
– A unique serial number s one-to-one mapped to this transaction tr(i→ j, s).
– The indices of the sources of this transactions (see Definition 2). The sources
are denoted by S(tr(i → j, s)), which is a set of previous transactions send
to i. This is equivalent to the input of Bitcoin.
– The value of this transaction Vt and the remaining value Vr after this trans-
action. This is equivalent to the output of Bitcoin.
– A digital signature created by node i, which is the digest of the aforemen-
tioned items encrypted with the private key of i.
Here, we only consider two-party transactions. The transactions are only recorded
in the chains of the related node. Hence, a transaction tr(i → j, s) is recorded
in the chains of nodes i and j.
2.2 Individual Blockchains
We consider a permissioned network with N nodes and each node has its own
blockchain. The blockchains are denoted by Bi, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} 3. A blockchain
Bi is then defined as an ordered set of blocks {Bi(1), Bi(2), . . .}, in which each
block contains a digest of its previous block, i.e., block Bi(j), j > 1 will contain
H(Bi(j − 1)). The genesis blocks (the first blocks in the chains) Bi(1) are dis-
tinctive and contain the information about their unique identities and the initial
balance of each node4. The initial balance can be seen as a transaction without
sources and has an unique index (see Definition 2). Furthermore, this transac-
tion is valid if the corresponding genesis block is included in some consensus.
Otherwise, it is invalid (see Subsections 2.3 and 2.4).
There are two types of blocks in the chains: transaction blocks (TBs) and
check points (CPs). We assume all genesis blocks are CPs. TBs are used to record
the transactions and CPs are used for the consensus scheme. Now we introduce
these two types of blocks.
Transaction Blocks As its name suggests, TB is used to record the transac-
tions. We denote the k-th TB in Bi by Ti(k). Then, if Ti(k) is the j-th block in
Bi, we say that Ti(k) ≡ Bi(j). A transaction block Ti(k) consists of a digest of
the previous block and M transaction messages ti(k,m), i.e., if Ti(k) ≡ Bi(j),
then Ti(k) consists of [H(Bi(j − 1)), ti(k, 1), ti(k, 2), . . . , ti(k,M)].
3 This definition is slightly naive since malicious nodes could have multiple versions of
their blockchains. For the sake of easier comprehension, we use this definition here
and will further address this problem in Section 3.
4 Our system only focus on the reliable value exchange, thus we assume that there
exists some pre-established agreement on the initial balance for the nodes.
Ci(1) Ti(1) Ti(2) Ci(2) Ti(3) Ti(4) Ti(5) Ci(3) Ti(6)
Bi(1) Bi(2) Bi(3) Bi(4) Bi(5) Bi(6) Bi(7) Bi(8) Bi(9)
Fig. 1. Example of a blockchain of node i with six TBs and three CPs.
Definition 1 (Transaction Message). A transaction message ti(k,m) is
the m-th message in the k-th transaction block. It consists a transaction tr(a→
b, s) where a = i or b = i.
Definition 2 (Transaction Index). If a transaction tr(a → b, s) is in the
transaction message ti(k,m), then a vector of [i, k,m] are called the index of
this transaction.
Note that since a transaction is written in the chains of both the sender
and the receiver, a valid transaction should have two indices. Also, the two
transaction messages of a transaction are identical.
Check Points CPs are a special type of blocks which contain no transaction.
Instead, they contain some established consensus. We use the consensus scheme
to reach consensus on the digests of the CPs of this round. Similar to the TBs,
we denote the k-th CP in Bi by Ci(k). Then, if Ci(k) is the j-th block in Bi, we
say that Ci(k) ≡ Bi(j). The CPs are defined as follows.
Definition 3 (Check Point (CP)). A check point consists of a digest of the
previous block and the consensus established in the previous round (see Subsec-
tion 2.3).
The relationship between blocks, TBs, and CPs is shown in Figure 1.
2.3 Consensus Scheme
Our consensus scheme is a consensus process used repetitively in rounds. In each
round, the consensus process is used to reach consensus on consensus messages
(CMs), which is defined as follows.
Definition 4 (Consensus Message (CM)). A consensus message of node
i in round r denoted by Mi(r) consists of the following information.
– i and r.
– The digest of a CP Ci(k) which has not been included in any consensus.
We call a CP is included in some consensus if and only if the digest of this
CP is in a CM and that CM has reached consensus.
– The position of the CP Ci(k) and its previous CP Ci(k − 1) in the chain,
i.e., two numbers j and j′ that Ci(k) ≡ Bi(j) and Ci(k − 1) ≡ Bi(j′).
– A digital signature of i, which is the digest of the aforementioned items
encrypted by the private key of i.
The consensus process of round r starts when the consensus process of round
r− 1 is complete and the consensus result, denoted by CON(r− 1), is acknowl-
edged by all honest nodes. Now, we describe the steps of the consensus process
for node i of the r-th round.
– Step 1: After CON(r − 1) is obtained, if a CP from node i is included in
CON(r − 1), it generates a new CP with CON(r− 1) and appends it to its
chain.
– Step 2: It generates a new CM using its latest CP, and uses this as its input
for the consensus process of this round.
– Step 3: A BFT algorithm is used to reach agreement on a set of input
CMs of this round. The following CMs will be excluded from this consensus
process by all honest nodes:
• The CMs of incorrect rounds.
• The CMs with incorrect digital signatures.
• The CP included in the CM has already been included in some previous
consensus.
• The index of the previous CP that has been used by a CM which has
already reached consensus. Also known as a “fork”.
– Step 4: Output the result of this consensus process denoted by CON(r),
which is a vector consisting the CMs ordered by i.
For Step 3, any consensus algorithm that satisfies the agreement, termina-
tion, and correctness properties introduced in Subsection 1.1 can be used. Some
of the choices are [7,17,18], which tolerant less than ⌊N−1
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⌋ malicious nodes.
Here, the honest and malicious nodes are defined as the following.
Definition 5 (Honest Node5). An honest node is a node that creates correct
CM messages and cooperates in the consensus process to reach consensus. More-
over, it always validates all of its transaction and only make transactions with
correct information, sufficient balance, and validated sources which have not been
used in previous transactions (see Subsection 2.4).
Definition 6 (Malicious Node). A malicious node can do anything to pre-
vent consensus, creates any kind of transaction, and manipulates its chain, e.g.,
creates forks, to confuse honest nodes. Moreover, malicious nodes can collude.
However, we assume that they cannot break the hash function or the asymmetric
encryption.
5 Our definition of the honest node is stronger than that in some other literature,
in which the honesty is round based, i.e., a node is considered honest if it does not
conduct malicious behaviors in that round. However, this strong assumption is solely
because that we would like to keep the core system as simple as possible. We will
later show in Subsection 4.2 that the definition can be easily weaken to the round
based honesty by simple mechanisms.
The consensus result CON(r) is a vector consisting all the CMs that have
reached consensus in this round. We denote the already established consensus till
round r by CON (r) = {CON(1), CON(2), . . . , CON(r)}. By the properties of
the BFT algorithm, CON(r) is known and should be recorded in the blockchains
of all honest nodes by the end of round r.
A CP included in CON (r) guarantees the tamper-proof property in the sense
that the transactions previous to this CP are unforgeable. Here, we introduce
the term correct piece.
Definition 7 (Correct Piece). An ordered set of blocks {Bi(j), . . . , Bi(k)}, k−
j ≥ 1 is called a piece if Bi(j) ≡ Ci(ℓ), Bi(k) ≡ Ci(ℓ+1). This piece is correct
if and only if:
– Ci(ℓ) and Ci(ℓ + 1) are both included in CON (r).
– All digests in {Bi(j), Bi(j + 1), . . . , Bi(k)} are correct.
2.4 Validation Scheme
With the established consensus CON (r), the honest nodes can validate indi-
vidual transactions without any knowledge of the transaction in advance and
thus achieves the implicit consensus. In this subsection, we introduce our val-
idation scheme. Note that there are two fundamental difference between our
system and other blockchain systems. First, invalid transactions are allowed in
our blockchains. Second, there is no globally agreed blockchain and each node
might have different observations of the blockchains of the network. Hence, we
will first give the definition of the valid transactions and invalid transactions in
our system. Then, we show that our validation scheme allows the honest nodes
to check the validity of the transactions.
Validity and Conditions for Validation In general, the validity of transac-
tions should be a global and unambiguous property that is independent of the
observation of the network by any specific node. In a ledger, a valid transaction
should have correct format, sufficient balance, unspent sources, and be signed by
the private key of the sender. Besides, each system has its own definition in the
validity of the transactions, e.g., a valid transaction in Bitcoin should be in the
longest chain for a sufficient long period of time. In our system, a valid transac-
tion should have two messages in both chains of the senders and the receivers.
Furthermore, it should also be included in the authentic chain. Hence, we have
the following definition.
Definition 8 (Validity). The validity conditions of a transaction tr(i → j, s)
are the following.
– Two Messages: The transaction is written in exact two identical messages
included in the chains of both sender and receiver, respectively.
– Correct Chains: The two messages are in correct pieces (Definition 7) and
all pieces that are previous to these two pieces in the corresponding chains
are also correct.
– Correct Messages: These messages are correct in the sense that all infor-
mation are correct and signed with the private key of i
– Valid Sources: The transactions which used as source are valid.
– No Double Spending: The sources have not been used by other transac-
tions.
– Sufficient Balance: The transaction value Vt plus the remaining value Vr
equals to the sum of all the remaining values of all sources.
A transaction is valid if it satisfies all the validity conditions in the observation
of any node in the network. Otherwise, it is an invalid transaction.
Then, to achieve implicit consensus, a validation scheme should satisfy the
following conditions.
– Liveness: All transactions can be verified by the validation scheme eventu-
ally, the result is either “validated”(verified as valid) or “falsificated” (detect
as fraud).
– Correctness: All transactions validated by the honest nodes are valid. All
transactions falsificated by the honest nodes are invalid.
Clearly, if a transaction satisfies the above conditions, it implies that the agree-
ment and correctness properties are satisfied with our validation scheme, i.e.,
they are in implicit consensus.
Our validation scheme consists of two parts: proof collection and validation
process. Now we introduce our validation scheme by considering the case that
node u want to validate the transaction tr(i → j, s), denoted by a function
Vu(tr(i→ j, s)).
Proof Collection The proof collection is a process that a node requests all
necessary information that it needs to validate a transaction, which is called the
proofs of this transaction.
Definition 9 (Proofs of a transaction). The proofs of a transaction tr(i →
j, s) consists of the following.
– All pieces of Bi from the first piece in the chain to the first piece which
contains tr(i→ j, s).
– All pieces of Bj from the first piece in the chain to the first piece which
contains tr(i→ j, s).
– For each source transaction of tr(i → j, s) or recursively the source of the
sources until the initial balance in the genesis block, denoted by tr(k → l, s′),
all pieces of Bk signed by k and Bl signed by l from the first pieces to the
ones containing tr(k → l, s′).
The proofs of a transaction are complete if all the aforementioned items are
collected. The proofs of a transaction are called correct if all the collected pieces
are correct.
To collect the proofs, three steps are taken by node u. All collected pieces are
verified and the incorrect pieces are immediately discarded. Once the complete
and correct proofs of the transaction are collected, the node terminates the
proof collection and enters the validation process. If the complete proofs cannot
be obtained within a certain time period, the transaction will be marked as
“undecided”. An undecided transaction could be validated in the future.
– Step 1: It requests the transaction indices of tr(i → j, s) from either node
i or j.
– Step 2: It requests all the missing proofs from either node i or j.
– Step 3: It broadcasts the request of the missing proofs to the whole network.
All the nodes are required to keeps the proofs of all transactions related to
themselves.
Validation Process
Definition 10 (Validation Process for a Transaction). A validation pro-
cess of a transaction tr(i→ j, s) includes the verification of the following items.
1. Two Messages: The transaction with the serial number s has two and only
two identical messages ti(m, k) and tj(n, ℓ).
2. Correct Messages: All information in the messages is correct and signed
with the private key of i.
3. No Double Spending: There are no forks for this transaction, i.e., there
does not exist a validated transaction tr′ written in message ti(m
′, k′) with
(k′ = k,m′ < m) or k′ < k and the source transactions S(tr′) ∩ S(tr(i →
j, s)) 6= ∅.
4. Validated Sources: All the source transactions of tr(i→ j, s) are validated.
5. Sufficient Balance: The transaction amount plus the remaining amount
equals to the sum of the remaining amounts of all sources. All the amounts
here are non-negative.
A transaction that passes or failed the validation process is called a validated
transaction or a falsificated transaction, respectively.
3 Correctness of the System
The correctness of our system is proved if the agreement, termination, and cor-
rectness conditions in Subsection 2.3 are satisfied for the consensus scheme and
the liveness and correctness conditions in Subsection 2.4 are satisfied for the val-
idation scheme. The consensus conditions are guaranteed by the BFT schemes.
For proofs we refers to the original papers of these schemes [4,5,18]. Here, we
prove the validation scheme satisfies the conditions of correctness and liveness.
For the sake of space, all the proofs are included in the appendices.
3.1 Liveness
The liveness condition is crucial since in our system, a transaction is only au-
thentic when it is validated. However, as can be observed from our validation
scheme, the liveness condition is in general not feasible since we allow the trans-
action to be “undecided”. Now, we give the following theorem and argue that
our system is already reliable if we guarantee that the liveness condition holds
for all transactions made by honest nodes.
Theorem 1 (Liveness of the Honest Nodes). If i and j are both honest
nodes, the outcome of the validation scheme for a transaction tr(i→ j, s) should
be either validated or falsificated before time t.6
Note that Theorem 1 does not guarantee that all transactions are eventu-
ally validated or falsificated, i.e., some of the transactions made by malicious
node violates the termination property, i.e., they cannot reach consensus to be
falsificated. However, the affect to the liveness is very little since the invalid
transactions have no impact on the functionality of this system, which is based
on the validated transactions. Then, the validated transactions can be proved to
be reliable and valid, which will be shown in the following subsection. However,
unidentified invalid transactions could cause another problem, spamming, which
will be addressed in Subsection 4.2.
3.2 Correctness
Correctness condition guarantees the validity of our validation scheme, i.e., the
validation result of the honest nodes will be consistent with the validity of the
transactions, which is a global and unambiguous property of the transaction.
Firstly, note that in our system there does not exist a globally agreed set
of blockchains Bi, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, i.e., in different time, nodes might have
different observations of the blockchain set Bi due to latency or intended forking
by malicious nodes. However, all the versions obtained by the honest nodes must
be aligned with the already established consensus CON (r). Hence, we define the
view of the blockchains in round r as follows.
Definition 11 (View). A view in consensus round r denoted by I(r) is a set
of blockchains Bi, i ∈ 1, 2, . . . , N with CON (r) as its consensus results.
Basically, a view is the observation of the network by the honest nodes. We
now show that the position, order, and the content of the CPs are identical in
all possible I(r).
Lemma 1 (Consistency of the CPs). If Bi(k) and Bi(ℓ) are two blocks in the
view I(r), both of them are CPs included in the established consensus CON (r),
and Bi(k) is the previous CP of Bi(ℓ), then Bi(k) is also the previous CP of
Bi(ℓ) in any other view I
′(r). Moreover, Bi(k) and Bi(ℓ) are identical to their
counterpart in other views, respectively.
6 We show that they will only be validated in Theorem 2.
Then we will show that the CPs protect the consistency of the pieces of the
chains, i.e., there cannot exist two distinctive pieces which start from the same
CP or end by the same CP which are both correct.
Lemma 2 (Consistency of the Pieces). If a piece of blockchain B = {Bi(k), Bi(k+
1), . . . , Bi(ℓ)} in a view I(r) is correct, then there does not exist another piece
B′ = {Bi(k), Bi(k+1), . . . , Bi(ℓ′)} or B′ = {Bi(k′), Bi(k′+1), . . . , Bi(ℓ)} in any
view I ′(r′), r′ ≥ r that is correct.
By Lemma 2, since the proofs of a transactions are simply a collection of
pieces, we directly have the following theorem.
Theorem 2 (Consistency of the Proofs). If P is the correct and complete
proofs of a transaction tr(i→ j, s) in a view I(r), then there does not exist proofs
P ′ 6= P of the transaction tr(i → j, s) which are also complete and correct in
any view I ′(r′), r′ ≥ r.
With the established lemmas and theorems, we prove the main theorem for
the correctness of the validation scheme.
Theorem 3 (Correctness of the Validation Scheme). Assume that u is an
honest node. Then, if Vu(tr(i → j, s)) = validated, then tr(i → j, s) is valid. If
Vu(tr(i→ j, s)) = falsificated, then tr(i→ j, s) is invalid.
4 Performance
In this section, we compare the performance of our system to other blockchain
systems with the focus on throughput and reliability.
4.1 Throughput
By design, the throughput of our system is independent of the consensus scheme
since each node can create as many transactions as they could with no guarantee
on validity. A fair throughput comparison should be between the rate of valid
transactions in our system, i.e., the amount of total valid transactions made in
our system per second, to the transactions rate of the other blockchain systems.
The valid transaction rate is determined by the validation process, which is then
determined by the amount of proofs that are required for each transaction. At
first glance, the amount seems to be a lot since the proofs do not only contain
all the related transactions, but also the chains of the nodes who make those
transactions. However, the collection is incremental and we will show that the
throughput is actually at least as good as some of the existing techniques.
First of all, if the transaction pattern of the network is isolated, e.g., exists
subgroups of the network that only have transactions within the subgroup. In
that case, the proofs of such transactions will only contain chains of the nodes
in that subgroup. As a result, our scheme has the same advantage as sharding
[15,16] and achieves unbounded performance. Since specific sharding mechanism
is not needed and the nodes simply optimize the storage and transmission costs
spontaneously, we call it spontaneous sharding. A detailed analyze is shown in
Appendix B. The same scenario holds for the micro transaction scenario allowed
by lightning network. When two nodes transact many transactions with each
other, the proofs are no more than the chain of each other. This is no more
complicated than the validation in lightning network. However, note that our
scheme achieves an uncompromised reliability. Hence, unlike lightning network
which only functions for micro transactions, the application of our scheme is not
economically restricted.
On the other hand, if the transaction pattern is more correlated in the sense
that there is no isolated subgroup, our scheme still has less message complexity
than O(N) since not all transactions are required to be collected by each node.
More specifically, node i do not need to store the chain of node j, if node j has
never made a transaction that is used as the source (or recursively sources of
the sources) of node i. As a result, the performance of our scheme is strictly
unbounded except for the very extreme transaction patterns. Moreover, rational
nodes will try to avoid that situation by choosing sources that minimize the
amount of information to transmit. In other words, if the network is rational, it
tends to be sharded with our scheme.
Note that although our throughput is unbounded, the latency still depends
on the BFT algorithm, thus not scalable. More precisely, the consensus is reached
on the CMs with a size of O(N). As a result, the latency would be high in a large
network. However, we can reduce the latency by using more scalable and efficient
BFT schemes like [7,13,18] since our scheme is not restricted to a specific BFT
algorithm.
4.2 Reliability
In has been proved that the reliability of validated transaction is the same as
the traditional BFT schemes since the correctness and agreement hold for all
honest nodes. Certainly, as discussed in Subsection 3.1, the price we pay is
the termination, that is, some of the invalid transactions made by malicious
node cannot be falsificated. The undecided transactions themselves do very little
harm to the reliability since honest nodes will not use undecided transactions as
sources thus this ambiguity will not propagate. However, it does give rooms to
the malicious nodes to spam invalid transactions to overwhelm the honest nodes.
This problem is similar to the DDoS (Distributed Denial-of-Service) attack which
can be solved by some reputation/blacklist scheme. Actually, we believe that
keeping the record of the invalid transactions is beneficial to the reliability of the
system, since it provides the necessary information for honest nodes to identify
malicious nodes and take actions.
Another problem is the degradation in the reliability if we loosen the con-
straint of the honest nodes in Definition 5 and allow honest nodes to be offline.
This will harm the liveness condition since there is a chance that the proofs of
valid transactions cannot be obtained when the nodes which have the proofs of
this transaction all go offline. However, this problem is actually solved by the
logic behind our system and the “self interest” phenomenon, i.e., every node is
responsible for its own transaction. In our system, a transaction is only valid if
it is validated by other nodes. Hence, it is in the interest of at least one of the
related parties to prove it to the other nodes. Furthermore, if a node wants to
use a transaction as the source for its transaction, it not only needs to prove the
validation of this transaction, but also needs to keep the proofs and show the
proofs to the other related party. The validation scheme is also censorship-free,
which suggests that any node that has validated a transaction can independently
show the complete and correct proofs to other honest nodes for the validation. In
other words, malicious nodes cannot prevent the termination property of valid
transactions. As a result, the valid transactions are as reliable as the traditional
BFT schemes since the agreement and correctness properties hold and the ter-
mination property is guaranteed by the self-interest of related parties.
5 Conclusions and Discussion
In this paper, we proposed a value-exchange blockchain system with a novel
consensus model, namely implicit consensus. Our system achieves significant
improvements in throughput and other important aspects comparing to other
blockchains techniques. We hope that the following proposed concepts would
shed a light on the future blockchain research.
– Termination condition of the BFT is not mandatory in a value exchange sys-
tem such as a distributed ledger. It will always be the interest of some nodes
to prove the validity and agreement of the transactions to the rest of the
network. Hence, we do not need extra mechanism to force that. Scalability
could then be achieved by leaving the termination condition aside.
– Side-chain transactions can be as reliable as they are on the main chain as
long as the whole side-chains of all the sources are examined. This is not
necessarily a heavy task since the amount of transactions that need to be
validated is still only a fraction of the whole transactions set.
– In our system, rational nodes will try to optimize their storage and message
transmission by only validate and keep the proofs for their own transac-
tions, which is a spontaneous sharding. Moreover, if multiple sources are
available for a transaction, they will choose the one that requires minimum
data transmission. Then, the sharding is also self-optimized.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. By the definition of honest nodes, i and j will add the transaction mes-
sages to their chains. The messages will be included in a correct piece before some
time t because of the conditions of the consensus scheme. Then, the correct and
complete proofs of this transactions can be obtained by honest nodes since i and
j are honest, which suggests that the outcome of the validation scheme will not
be “undecided” and complete the proof.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. The proof follows from the definition of the CM and the consensus scheme.
By the definition of the CM, the information of the position, order, and the di-
gests of the content of the CPs are included in the CMs. Moreover, the CMs
with incorrect information or the ones that attempts to create forks in CPs are
discarded during the consensus process. As a result, the consensus CON (r) fixes
the position, order, and the content of the CPs. Then, this lemma is established
if the two views I(r) and I ′(r) have the same consensus results.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. We prove this lemma by contradiction.
Assume there exists another correct piece of blockchain B′ = {Bi(k
′), Bi(k
′+
1), . . . , Bi(ℓ
′)}, k′ 6= k or ℓ′ 6= ℓ that B′ 6= B in a view I ′(r′). By the definitions
of a correct piece, we know that Bi(k), Bi(k
′), Bi(ℓ), Bi(ℓ
′) are all CPs included
in CON (r). Moreover, by Lemma 1, we have ℓ = ℓ′, Bi(ℓ) = Bi(ℓ′) if k = k′ and
k = k′, Bi(k) = Bi(k
′) if ℓ = ℓ′.
Then, since both B and B′ are correct, all digests of all blocks in these pieces
should be correct. Then, since B 6= B′, there must exists two blocks Bi(n) 6=
B′i(n) such that Bi(n + 1) = B
′
i(n + 1), which suggests H(Bi(n)) = H(B
′
i(n)).
This contradicts the fact that the digests are collision free.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. We firstly proof the following statement: If Vu(tr(i → j, s)) = validated
and all of its sources are valid, then tr(i → j, s) is valid. If Vu(tr(i → j, s)) =
falsificated and none of its source are falsificated, then tr(i→ j, s) is invalid. We
prove this by contradiction.
Firstly, assume that there exist an invalid transaction tr(i→ j, s) with valid
sources and it is validated by an honest node u. Then, the correct and complete
proofs of this transaction must have been collected by u. Furthermore, it must
have passed the validation process. Then, since the steps in validation process
(Definition 10) are precisely the validity conditions (Definition 8) except the
Correct Chains, which has already been guaranteed by the proof collection.
By Definition 8, there exists an observation of this network in which all the
validity conditions for this transactions are met, thus this transaction is valid.
This contradict our assumption.
Then, we assume that there exists a valid transaction tr(i → j, s) with no
falsificated source and it is falsificated by an honest node u. By the definition
of the validation scheme, node u must have collected all the proofs for this
transaction, which includes all the proofs for the sources. Hence all of its source
are validated, thus are valid. Then, at least one of the items in the Definition 10
except the Validated Sources is violated, which suggests that the validity
conditions (Definition 8) are not fulfilled. Then, by Theorem 2, the proofs are
consistent. Hence, there does not exist an observation by an honest node in
which all conditions are satisfied. By Definition 8, this transaction is invalid,
which contradicts our assumption.
The theorem is thus proved by recursively using the proved statement on
the transactions and their sources since the validity of the initial balance can be
checked with CON (r).
B Analysis of the Throughput
Here we lower bound the rate of the valid transactions in our system. For the sake
of easier comprehension, we assume that the transactions rate, communication
capacity, and computation capacity are uniform for all nodes and all time and
the adversaries do not spam invalid transactions.
We consider a subset of node in the network G, |G| = g ≤ N which only do
transactions with the nodes in the subset. Assume that each chain grows with
a rate of R messages/second and the duration of a consensus round is T . The
amount of messages generated by this subset of nodes in a round is RgT , which
can be divided into two parts: valid transactions and invalid transactions. Since
the honest nodes only make transactions that they can validate, the amount of
valid transactions is at least RvgT where Rv is the validation rate. The invalid
transaction can only be made by adversaries. Since they do not spam, we have
the amount of the invalid transactions equals to RagT where Ra = O(Rv). Then,
we have R = Rv +Ra = O(Rv).
Let us analyze the duration that a node needs to validate all transactions
that it makes in a round. For the proof collection, it needs no more than all
chains in G, which requires data transmissions with no more than an amount
of RgT messages since the proof collections is incremental, i.e., only the newly
generated parts of the chains are needed. The proofs are collected based on point-
to-point transmissions. Each node broadcasts its chain at a rate of Ccomm/g,
where Ccomm is the communication capacity (message/second) of the nodes. The
collection rate is then Ccomm since nodes broadcast their chains simultaneously
in different channels. Hence, we have the duration of proof collection tp ≤
RgT
Ccomm
.
For validation, in the worst case, all of these transactions need to be validated,
which requires duration tv ≤
RgT
Ccomp
, where Ccomp is the computation capacity
(message/second). By basic queuing theory, we should have tp + tv = T .
Then, since honest nodes only make transactions that they can validate and
the in all the RgT messages, the expected invalid message Since all validated
transactions are valid (Theorem 3), combining all the inequalities above, we have
a lower bound on the rate of the valid transactions for each node Rv ≥ Ω(
C
g
),
where C =
CcommCcomp
Ccomm+Ccomp
. Then, the throughput of this group is lower bounded
by Ω(C) since a group has g nodes that can simultaneously make transactions.
This lower bound suggests that the throughput in any separate group of
nodes in the network is completely independent of the rest of the network and
only depends on the communication and computation capacity of the nodes in
that group. This is an ideal property to have for a blockchain system since the
throughput is no longer limited by the throughput of the consensus algorithm.
In the best case that nodes are paired and only do transaction with each other,
we achieve a throughput of O(CN). In the worst case that all nodes make trans-
actions with all other nodes, we achieve a throughput of O(C).
